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Hamann’s Influence on Wittgenstein 
 
Abstract  
This paper examines Johann Georg Hamann’s influence on Ludwig 
Wittgenstein’s late philosophy. Wittgenstein’s letters, diaries and 
Drury’s memoirs show that Wittgenstein discussed Hamann’s author-
ship in the early 1930s and 1950s. Wittgenstein’s diary notes and the 
Cambridge lectures show that Wittgenstein’s discussion of Hamann’s 
views in 1931 corresponds to adopting a view of harmony of language 
and reality that resembles Hamann’s. Using Hamann’s view of language 
as an intertwining of signs, objects and meanings in use as a point of 
comparison for reading Wittgenstein reveals an overlap in their 
philosophies. The harmony of language and reality takes place in 
communicative use, so non-communicative private languages and pre-
linguistic ideal forms of representation are not possible. Language is a 
free response to reality, and it involves belief-systems and trust. 
 
 
Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951) stands in the tradition of German 
linguistic philosophy and Viennese philosophy, where the issues of 
logic, linguistic philosophy, ethics and religion are interrelated (Janik 
& Toulmin 1973; Glock 2015). Johann Georg Hamann (1730–1788) 
is a Christian thinker who started the first linguistic turn in 
philosophy and the German linguistic tradition with his Metakritik of 
Kant’s philosophy (see Bayer 2002; Dickson 1995; Betz 2009). John 
Betz (2005, 291–292) even argues that “Hamann is to be credited 
with the ideas typically attributed to the late Wittgenstein”. In this 
paper I investigate Hamann’s influence on Wittgenstein. I show the 
following: 
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1. Wittgenstein referred to Hamannian themes and to Hamann’s 
authorship in 1930–31 and 1951. 
2. Wittgenstein discussed and was inspired by the key Hamannian 
themes of divine language and an epistemology of faith. 
Wittgenstein developed a view of harmony of language and reality 
resembling Hamann’s in 1931. 
3. Using Hamann’s view of language as a point of comparison for 
interpreting Wittgenstein reveals an important systematic overlap in 
their views. Language consists of signs, practices of use and a 
meaning that is intertwined with the sign and the object through use. 
Use is communicative and concrete, so private psychological 
languages and pseudo-mathematical ideal languages are not possible. 
Language is a free response to reality, and it is based on trust. 
The philosophical point of highlighting the overlaps between 
Hamann and Wittgenstein is to bring their common approaches into 
focus, in order to offer resources for new starting-points in 
systematic philosophy. There are several thematically overlapping 
discussions of connections between Hamann and Wittgenstein. I will 
first present the most important contributions to highlight the 
themes that arise from the discussions and the similarities and 
contrasts between the different contributions. I then use them as 
background material for my own discussion, which is probably 
closest to Helmut Hein’s comparison (1983). These discussions 
feature the themes of communicative action, religion, the critique of 
Enlightenment philosophy and the possibility of an influence of 
Hamann on Wittgenstein. 
Charles Taylor (1985) and Martin Kusch (2011) argue that both 
thinkers stand in an expressivist tradition. Taylor argues that 
language is expressive and communicative action, and language-use 
is primary to the functions of language and reason. Language forms 
human concerns, values and conceptual rules, and constitutes a 
public space for a language community. Kusch connects the 
communicative role of language with religion and theological 
grammar. He compares Wittgenstein’s grammar quote (PI: §373)1 
                                                          
1 “Grammar tells what kind of object anything is. (Theology as grammar.)” 
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with Hamann’s (N II: 129; ZH 7: 169).2 Kusch argues that theo-
logical grammar describes how religious practices and the 
communication between God and the believer work. Both Hamann 
and Wittgenstein argue that pictures are indispensable for divine-
human relationships, because they are used in religious language-
games. These interpretations, then, locate Hamann and Wittgenstein 
in a tradition that emphasizes communicative practices as a basis of 
language, reason and sociality, and emphasizes the use of symbols in 
communicative practices. 
The overlap of religion and language is another common theme 
in the literature discussing the relationship between Wittgenstein and 
Hamann. Kusch’s work (2011) falls into this category as well, as he 
argues that Hamann’s view of the Bible as constituting the divine-
human relationship offers a background for Wittgenstein’s views on 
grammar. Regine Munz (2000) argues that Wittgenstein used 
religious themes and arguments as examples of linguistic 
communication during his middle period of 1929–37. The religious 
examples forge a link between language and religion. Religion is a 
paradox that can be understood through analysis of religious 
symbols, which also sheds light on language. Linguistic symbols 
function like religious and magical rituals, because rituals are 
instituted. The meaning of an expression is its social spirit, which 
must be shared with its hearer in order for a specific speech-act to 
make sense. 
Tim Labron (2009) also compares Wittgenstein’s late philosophy 
with Chalcedonian Christology, which holds that the human and 
divine are intertwined. Social language-games similarly reveal logic 
and have logical properties, but at the same time logic receives social 
properties. The parallelism between Hamann’s concept of divine 
language and language-games also arises in Hein (1983), who argues 
that Hamann uses the metaphor of the divine Word to emphasize 
                                                          
2 “[I]t was a theologian of penetrating wit who pronounced theology, – the oldest sister of 
the highest sciences, – to be a grammar of the language of Holy Writ” (N II: 129 = H: 22). 
“Do you understand my principle that reason is linguistic and that I follow Luther in making 
all of philosophy into a grammar” (ZH 7: 169). 
I refer to Hamann’s and Wittgenstein’s published writings by using abbreviations that are 
explained in the bibliography. I have translated the Hamann quotations myself using 
Haynes’, Betz’s and Dickson’s translations as a background, unless I quote them directly. 
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that a sign, its object and meaning are united. Wittgenstein develops 
the concept of language-games (PI: §23) to emphasize the 
intertwining of signs and objects, senses and reason in language-use. 
The third theme that arises often in comparisons of Hamann and 
Wittgenstein is their critique of the Enlightenment. Jonathan Gray 
(2012) and Gwen Griffith-Dickson (1995: 311–318) argue that 
Wittgenstein and Hamann criticize the philosophical tendency to 
abstract words from ordinary language, to attempt to construct ideal 
languages and then identify the ideal concepts with reality itself, thus 
“taking words for concepts and concepts for things” (ZH 5: 264). Hamann 
and Wittgenstein emphasize that language can be used as a key to 
solve philosophical problems by paying attention to ordinary 
language-use. Gray emphasizes Nietzsche-style genealogy and 
creative language-use, whereas Dickson argues that locating language 
in its lived relationships is a key to overcoming philosophical 
confusions. Hein argues that Hamann and Wittgenstein “have 
common opponents, common goals and use similar ‘strategies’” 
(1983: 22). They criticize the Enlightenment’s conceptual gaps 
senses/reason, subject/object, mind/world, reason/feeling and 
theory/practice by developing a view of “sensuous reason” that is 
located in language. Both reject the existence of an ideal foundation 
outside the world. Knowledge is based on belief-systems and faith, 
which is trust in and recognition of present reality. Labron (2009) 
similarly argues that the concept of language-games overcomes the 
conceptual gaps and skeptical problems of modern philosophy. 
These discussions point to the possibility of Hamann influencing 
Wittgenstein. Gray (2012) argues that Wittgenstein could have 
known Hamann through Fritz Mauthner (1849–1923) or Søren 
Kierkegaard (1813–1855). Kusch proposes that Wittgenstein got 
Martin Luther’s (1483–1548) view of theology as a grammar from 
Hamann or somebody discussing Hamann’s views, because 
Hamann, as noted, uses similar language about theological grammar 
as Wittgenstein. In fact, Mauthner used Hamann’s grammar quote 
as a motto of his critique of language (ZH 7: 169; H: xiii, n. 6). Munz 
(2000) points out that Wittgenstein discussed Kierkegaard’s views in 
1931, and Hamann’s views on 22.2.1931 (DB: 40). She argues that 
these discussions (DB: 40–43, 64–66) show that Wittgenstein viewed 
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religious symbols as paradoxes. She then argues that Wittgenstein 
used the story of the wedding of Cana (DB: 46, 6.5.1931) as an 
example of a religious paradox in need of a symbolic analysis. 
Wittgenstein’s analysis shows that religious and linguistic symbols 
contain their meaning in themselves, and the meaning is a spirit that 
is formed in the interplay between the actor, the communicative act 
and its receiver (cf. ZH 5: 272; Dickson 1995: 338). 
1. Wittgenstein and Hamann’s Authorship 
Wittgenstein discusses Hamann in conversations, diary entries and 
letters. Wittgenstein mentioned Hamann to Maurice O’Connor 
Drury in a conversation in 1930: 
I have been reading in a German author, a contemporary of Kant’s, 
Hamann, where he says,  commenting on the story of the Fall in 
Genesis: ‘How like God to wait until the cool of the evening before 
confronting Adam with his transgression.’ Now I would not for the life 
of me dare to say, ‘how like God.’ I wouldn’t claim to know how God 
should act. Do you understand Hamann’s remark? Tell me what you 
think – I would really like to know. (Drury 1981: 122) 
Wittgenstein discusses Hamann again in a diary remark on 22.2.1931: 
Hamann sieht Gott wie einen Teil der Natur an & zugleich wie die 
Natur. 
Und ist damit nicht das religiöse Paradox ausgedrückt: “Wie kann die 
Natur ein Teil der Natur sein?” 
[…] 
Der Verkehr mit Autoren wie Hamann, Kierkegaard macht ihre 
Herausgeber anmaßend. Diese  Versuchung würde der Herausgeber 
der Cherubinischen Wandersmannes nie fühlen noch auch der 
Confessionen der Augustin oder einer Schrift Luthers. 
Es ist wohl, daß die Ironie eines Autors den Leser anmaßend zu machen 
geneigt ist. 
Es ist dann etwa so: sie sagen sie wissen daß sie nichts wissen bilden 
sich aber auf diese Erkenntnis enorm viel ein. (DB: 40–41) 
Wittgenstein also referred to Hamann in a letter to Rush Rhees on 
14.3.1951. In the letter, Wittgenstein writes: 




The books I have read recently were: “Studies in Classic American 
Literature” by D.H. Lawrence [...] some Hamann (which is terribly 
difficult for me), “Moby Dick” [...] bits of the Old Testament, 
“Rommel” by Brigadier Young [...]. (McGuinness 2008: 475) 
The letters were edited by Brian McGuinness, who writes in a 
footnote that Ludwig Hänsel sent the second volume of Hamann’s 
collected works (N II) to Wittgenstein in 1950 as a Christmas 
present. Wittgenstein again found Hamann difficult to understand, 
just like in 1930–31. 
 Wittgenstein alludes to two Hamannian themes in these 
references. One is Hamann’s view of divine language, which he sees 
as a paradox. The other is Hamann’s view of Socratic ignorance and 
knowledge that is based on faith (see Betz 2009: 82–84). One can 
draw different conclusions from these references. The weakest 
conclusion is that Wittgenstein discussed themes in Hamann’s 
writings and he could have known these themes e.g. through 
Mauthner and Kierkegaard (see Gray 2012). The strongest is that 
Wittgenstein read Hamann at least in 1930–31 and 1950–51. 
One should note three points. First, Wittgenstein comments the 
reception of Hamann’s authorship by claiming that Hamann’s 
editors are treating his writings arrogantly, as Hamann’s style of 
communication is ironic and indirect (see Betz 2009: 8–17, 68–71; 
Dickson 1995: 25–27). Wittgenstein is comparing Hamann’s style of 
writing and his indirect style of authorship with other authors, e.g. 
Luther. Commenting on Hamann’s authorship requires at least an 
acquaintance with his main themes and with his style. It also requires 
that Hamann has made an impression on Wittgenstein. Second, one 
can ask, what “reading in” means here. Ordinarily, saying “I read it 
in the newspaper” implies that one read the newspaper. One could, 
however, claim that it is possible that Wittgenstein used Hamann as 
an inspiration without directly reading him.3 This possibility however 
requires that Wittgenstein read Hamann via a second-hand source 
and picked up themes in Hamann. Third, one cannot dispute that 
Wittgenstein read Hamann in 1950–51, as he directly says that he did 
so (McGuinness 2008: 473). There is then at least a strong possibility 
                                                          
3 As was suggested by an anonymous reviewer of this paper. 
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that Wittgenstein read Hamann in 1930–31 and 1950–51. In any 
case, one can draw the conclusion that Wittgenstein was at least 
acquainted with Hamann’s main themes and his style of authorship 
in both 1930–31 and 1950–51. 
Wittgenstein, then, discussed the theme of divine language in 
Hamann in 1931, when he was formulating his views of the harmony 
of language and reality (DB: 40; Baker & Hacker 1985: 81–91).  
Hamann expresses a core idea of his philosophy of language by using 
the metaphor of a sacrament:  
What transcendental philosophy is vainly fishing for with its long 
writings, I have pointed to the sacrament of language for the sake of the 
weak reader, the letters as its elements and the spirit of its institution. 
(N III: 289; cf. H: 217–218) 
Bayer (2002) argues that Hamann uses the Lutheran doctrine of 
sacraments as the model for the union of rational concepts and 
sensible objects in language. According to Luther, a sacrament is 
constituted by elements like bread and wine and the words of 
institution like “This is my body”. The words of institution consti-
tute a use for the physical elements in the context of God’s covenant 
with man, which is not dependent on human response. Then Christ 
and God’s grace are present in the physical elements, because the 
elements have a use in the communicative relationship of man and 
God. Luther puts this clearly: “The spirit consists in the use, not the 
object” (LW 37, 92). A sacrament then consists of three parts: 
1. Elements: a physical sign like bread and wine. 
2. Institution: a rule for symbolic use that is based on Jesus’ words like 
“This is my body”. 
3. Divine presence against the background of a relationship: God’s 
grace is present due to the use of the signs in the relationship of 
God’s covenants with man. 
Luther’s use theory of theological language is also directed against 
the Augustinian view of language. Bayer (1991: 36–39) argues that 
Luther reached his theological breakthrough when he realized that 
theological language consists fundamentally of speech acts and 
linguistic action (see Green 2014; Bayer 2002: 9–17; cf. RF), so 
reference is not foundational to it. Expressions like “I absolve you 
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of your sins!” do not refer to a separate absolution, but they instead 
accomplish and communicate it. Theological language is therefore 
fundamentally communicative, and sign and its object go together in 
communicative use. 
Hamann takes this picture and uses it straightforwardly to 
interpret language-use and divine presence in nature (Bayer 2002: 
374–396). I interpret Hamann by applying the sacramental metaphor 
to Wittgenstein’s example (PI: §197). Language consists of word-
signs like “Let’s play a game of chess!” and the institution of 
language-use, like the practices of playing chess. The word-signs are 
the elements of language. These elements are by themselves just 
sensuous and material sounds, ink-spots and dead non-words. They 
only become definite objects for the understanding through their 
institution of meaning in use. It is well known that this meaning and its 
determination consists of the combination of an a priori arbitrary but a 
posteriori necessary word-sign with the intuition of an object.  The 
concept of an object is then given to, stamped upon and made concrete 
for the understanding through this repeated band mediated both by the 
word-sign and the intuition of the object. (N III: 288; cf. H: 216) 
The institutions of language-use then connect the words “Let’s play 
a game of chess!” with intuitions of chess. Hamann takes basic 
intuitions to be practices like playing music and painting. He argues 
that Kantian forms of intuition like space and time are symbolic 
forms of sensuously mediated bodily practices: 
the oldest language was music, and the felt rhythm […] and breathing 
of the nose is the bodily archetypical picture for measuring time and its 
numerical relationships. (N III: 286; cf. H: 211)  
Basic intuitions are thus sensuous and bodily practices (Bayer 2002: 
329–336). The institution of practices of language-use in playing 
chess connects the words “Let’s play a game of chess!” with basic 
intuitions of the game of chess like moving pieces, following the 
rules of chess and making plans. This institution gives the word-sign 
“let’s play a game of chess!” a use through connecting it with playing 
chess and following its rules through the repeated band of regular 
use in practices. The meaning of the words “Let’s play a game of 
chess!” is then mediated for the understanding through the use of 
word-signs in practical relationships. 
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This is also Hamann’s answer to the problem of the harmony of 
language and reality, or how rational and linguistic concepts can be 
used of real empirical objects. Since use connects the meaning of the 
words “Let’s play a game of chess!” with the words themselves and 
the words with chess-pieces and practices of playing chess and 
following its rules, it connects the meaning of the words “Let’s play 
a game of chess!” with their objects, like the rules of chess and chess-
pieces. The triadic relationship between signs, objects and meanings 
only takes place in relationships of action and communication, or 
forms of life: “The ‘combination’ and the ‘band’ of this triad is a 
living one only inside specific forms of language and life” (Bayer 
2002: 387; cf. PI: §§197, 431–432). Hamann’s metaphor of 
sacramental language thus interprets language in terms of elements, 
institutions and relationships: 
1. Elements: word-signs and expressions like the sentence “Let’s play 
a game of chess!” 
2. Institution: regular use connecting the words “Let’s play a game of 
chess!” with bodily practices like moving pieces, following rules, 
making plans and playing chess. 
3. Objectivity of concepts against the background of forms of life: 
Concepts are delivered to the understanding and connected to 
objects through regular use in linguistic practices and forms of life. 
Hamann, then, developed views that at least foreshadowed Wittgen-
stein’s later work (Betz 2004: 291–292). Bayer also shows that the 
definition of sacramental language corresponds to Hamann’s view 
of divine presence in nature (2002: 389–393; see DB: 40). Hamann 
expresses his view of the relationship between God and nature in the 
slogan: “Speak, that I may see you – This wish was fulfilled by creation, 
which is a speech to creatures through creatures” (H: 65/N II: 198; 
see also N III: 32/H: 108–109). The slogan is a formulation of the 
Christian doctrine of creation. The world is divine communication 
or an address, which is mediated through creation as a whole and 
Jesus Christ. Nature is a book, which has an Author and a reader (cf. 
Munz 2000: 132). Nature is, then, involved in an exchange of words 
with God. The phrase “to creatures” means that human beings and 
Nature as a whole are responding to an Other, who is not reduced 
to nature and who is free to act. The phrase “through creatures” 
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means that God enters the world in Jesus Christ, and His words are 
mediated by physical facts and entities. Divine language binds signs, 
meanings and objects together. Divine language consists of 
elements, institutions and divine ideas. The relationships of creation 
are the institutions of divine language, which determine the roles and 
the “use” of creatures in the drama of reality. Creatures are the 
elements of the speech, because they mediate creaturely relationships 
and God’s speech (Bayer 2012: 72–78; see also Bayer 2002; Dickson 
1995). I’ll again use an example from Wittgenstein (CV: 51–52) to 
illustrate Hamann’s view of divine language:4 
1. Elements: a phenomenon of nature, e.g. trees bowing to a saint. 
2. Institution: the phenomenon has a use in a communicative exchange 
between creatures and God, as the saint exchanges words with his 
hearers and God, and God uses the phenomenon as a symbolic 
gesture of validating the words of the saint. 
3. Symbolizing divine ideas in a communicative relationship: the trees 
symbolize the divine idea of validating the saint, because the 
phenomena are used as a gesture in communication between the 
saint, the hearers and God. 
 
2. Wittgenstein, Hamann and Rule-Following in 1929–31 
The parallelism between Hamann’s and Wittgenstein’s views of 
language then raises the question: is it possible to show a direct 
influence? The question is difficult because of the nature of 
Hamann’s influence and Wittgenstein’s style of using his sources. 
Betz describes Hamann’s influence as a black hole: it cannot be seen, 
but it pulls authors to its orbit (2009: 14–15). Wittgenstein famously 
describes his philosophical style as reproductive: he takes up themes 
                                                          
4 A miracle is, as it were, a gesture which God makes. As a man sits quietly & then makes an 
impressive gesture, God lets the world run on smoothly & then accompanies the words of 
a Saint by a symbolic occurrence, a gesture of nature. It would be an instance if, when a 
saint has spoken, the trees around him bowed, as if in reverence.—Now, do I believe that 
this happens? I don't.  
 The only way for me to believe in a miracle in this sense would be to be impressed by 
an occurrence in this particular way. So that I should say e.g.: "It was impossible to see these 
trees & not to feel that they were responding to the words.” (CV: 51; cf. DB: 46-47) 
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and inspiration from others, and his originality is in the soil his 
thinking offers for the seeds taken from other thinkers (CV: 16, 42; 
cf. Janik and Toulmin 1973: 22–24). It will then be very difficult to 
directly observe Hamann’s influence on Wittgenstein, as Wittgen-
stein discusses the ideas of other thinkers by internalizing them into 
his own work, and Hamann’s influence can only be traced through 
similarities. 
Allan Janik’s and Stephen Toulmin’s book Wittgenstein’s Vienna 
(1973) offers methodological leads for discussing Wittgenstein’s use 
of his sources. They argue that Wittgenstein’s receptive thinking style 
means that he takes up problems and ideas in his intellectual milieu, 
and then synthetizes and approaches them in novel ways. Moreover, 
Wittgenstein’s work is located in a tradition that connects the critique 
of language with wider religious and ethical issues. Furthermore, it is 
possible to locate his works in philosophical (e.g. Kantian and 
Kierkegaardian) traditions by pointing out broad similarities. 
Toulmin’s and Janik’s discussion can also be complemented by Roy 
Bhaskar’s critical realism (2008): once one has noted a pattern of 
phenomena and explained them, one can propose a causal 
mechanism producing them. It thus becomes possible to point out 
Hamann’s influence on Wittgenstein by first identifying the themes 
that Wittgenstein took up from Hamann, identifying a systematic 
overlap between their philosophies, and reconstructing the process 
of argument that Wittgenstein used to develop the Hamannian ideas 
and themes. 
Wittgenstein famously got an impulse for looking at 
philosophical problems from a new perspective, when Piero Sraffa 
had refuted the picture theory’s appeal to ideal logical form soon 
after Wittgenstein returned to Cambridge (i.e. 1929–1930). Sraffa 
had shown an Italian gesture that means “Nonsense!” to 
Wittgenstein and then asked what the logical form of the gesture is. 
Wittgenstein felt like a pruned tree: the dead branches of the picture 
theory had been cut, and he could approach the problems of rule-
following and the harmony of language and reality from a new 
perspective (Monk 1991, 260–261). 
At the same time, Wittgenstein also discussed writers on religion 
like James George Frazer (1854–1941), Kierkegaard and Hamann. 
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His discussions intertwine the themes of religion, anthropology and 
language in a nexus that is typical for his philosophy of language 
(Janik and Toulmin 1973; Munz 2000). He refers to Hamann’s 
theory of divine language, which corresponds to Hamann’s views on 
the harmony of language and reality (Bayer 2002: 389–393). 
Wittgenstein first took it to be a paradox in February 1931, but then 
applied it to interpret the Cana miracle story on 6.5.1931 (DB 40: 
46–47). During 1930–32, Wittgenstein developed a view on the 
harmony of language and reality that resembles Hamann’s, as can be 
seen from his Cambridge Lectures (LWL) and PI §§431–432 (see 
Baker & Hacker 1985).  
Wittgenstein’s development in 1930–31 can then be approached 
with Lev Vygotsky’s theory of double stimulation. Developing new 
concepts and models of solving problems has two requirements. The 
subject must be presented with a problem that cannot be solved with 
the means he can use. He must also be offered a way of solving it 
with a fresh strategy for synthetizing concepts, experience and 
solving problems (Vygotsky 1962: 56–59). Janik and Toulmin argue 
(1973: 224–230) that Wittgenstein’s view of language-games is a 
product of a process that starts from the question of the possibility 
of linguistic representation, religious questions and the interplay 
between these two. I furthermore argue that it took an 
anthropological turn from Sraffa’s critique, which showed the 
inadequacy of the picture theory, and that religious themes like 
Hamann’s view of divine language offered inspiration for a new 
anthropological, practice- and communication-oriented starting-
points for approaching language (cf. Monk 1991: 260–261; Munz 
2000). 
Here one has to connect the Hamannian themes with 
Wittgenstein’s reading of Frazer’s Golden Bough (RF). Munz (2000) 
discusses Wittgenstein’s reply to Frazer at length. Frazer argues that 
magic is based on loose associations that lead to erroneous views on 
causation. According to Munz, Wittgenstein holds that the 
distinction between beliefs and practices cannot be made, as 
language is at its core mythological. She argues that Wittgenstein 
applies the view that meaning is use to religious language, where 
mythical rituals and their meanings are intertwined. I argue that 
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Wittgenstein offers the harmony of a wish and its fulfillment in 
communication as a counter-model for religious language and uses 
it to criticize Frazer’s attempts to debunk religion. Religious rituals 
must be understood as expressive communication. Magic, religion 
and language are based on symbolism, as the harmony of language 
and reality takes place in the symbol. A religious ritual like a rain-
dance symbolically represents and mythologically enacts the 
connection between a wish and its fulfillment, and Wittgenstein 
mentions sacraments like baptism in this context (RF: 125). All 
language is similarly symbolic and ceremonial at its core and cannot 
be separated from mythology. 
Wittgenstein’s discussions of Frazer’s view of religious symbols 
are analogous to his discussion of Hamann and the relationship 
between God and the world on 22.2.1931: How can God be a part 
of God, if God is like nature and a part of it (DB: 40)? Munz (2000: 
129–131) argues that Wittgenstein first interprets Hamann’s ideas as 
a Russell-type paradox of signs and their objects in light of the logical 
problems he was discussing in his lectures: how God∈God? 
Wittgenstein then uses Kierkegaard to interpret religious symbols as 
paradoxes that express a higher truth. I argue that Wittgenstein 
discusses Hamann’s view of Divine Presence in nature: God is like 
nature and a part of nature, so God is present in nature. The position 
Wittgenstein is here discussing is Hamann’s view of the language of 
God, which corresponds to Hamann’s sacramental or ritualistic view 
of language. It also plays a similar role in Hamann’s metacritique as 
the concept of language-games does in Wittgenstein (see Hein 1983). 
Wittgenstein found Hamann and his theological ideas difficult to 
understand in 1930 and 1951 (see Drury 1981: 122; McGuinness 
2008: 475), so he saw Hamann’s view of Divine Presence as a 
paradoxical riddle in 1931 as well. Here Wittgenstein interprets 
divine presence in terms of a part-whole relationship and the divine 
as a Deus sive Natura, so he interprets Hamann to raise the para-
doxical possibility that God is a part of God. The Spinozist God thus 
“does not reveal himself in the world” (TLP: 6.432; see Garver 1994: 
133–145; TLP: 6.44–45). Wittgenstein however returned to the 
theme of the self-revelation of God in nature and history when 
discussing the miracles of Jesus in a diary entry on 6.5.1931 (cf. CV: 
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52–53). We can ask, does Wittgenstein offer a Hamannian model of 
miracles and divine revelation in nature by interpreting them as 
“speech to creatures through creatures”? I argue that he does:  
Wenn man Wunder Christi etwa das Wunder auf der Hochzeit zu Kana 
so verstehen will wie Dostojewski es tat, dann muß man sie als Symbole 
auffassen. Die Verwandlung von Wasser in Wein ist höchstens 
erstaunlich & wer es könnte würden wir anstaunen aber mehr nicht. Es 
kann also nicht das das Herrliche sein. [...] Es muß das Wunderbare sein 
das dieser Handlung ihren Inhalt & ihre Bedeutung gibt. Und damit 
meine ich nicht das Außergewöhnliche, oder noch nie die Dagewesene, 
sondern den Geist in dem es getan wird und für den die Verwandlung 
von Wasser in Wein nur ein Symbol ist (gleichsam) eine Geste. [...] Als 
Geste, als Ausdruck muß das Wunder verstanden werden, wenn es zu 
uns reden soll. Ich könnte auch sagen: Nur wenn er es tut in einem 
wunderbaren Geist es tut ist es ein Wunder. Ohne diesen Geist ist es 
nur eine außerordentlich seltsame Tatsache. (DB: 46) 
Munz’s (2000: 131–133) interpretation is that the miraculous is 
constituted by the communication between the actor, the act and the 
reception (cf. Bayer 2012: 72–74). The miraculous is the spirit of the 
act of performing the miracle, and the spirit constitutes the gesture. 
Understanding a miracle requires sharing its communicative spirit. 
Wittgenstein thus applied symbolic analysis to religious signs to 
reach the conclusion that a linguistic symbol and its meaning are 
intertwined. I argue that Wittgenstein’s interpretation of the miracle 
resembles Hamann’s theory of divine language. The extraordinary 
facts are not miraculous as such. The miracle instead consists in the 
spirit of the symbolic act, which arises out of the acts of the person 
who is using the extraordinary facts as a gesture to address the guests. 
The physical facts of a miracle are thus a symbol that mediate its 
spirit. That is, the physical facts make the divine spirit present by 
functioning as divine communication between God, the natural 
phenomena and the wedding guests. The miracle is thus interpreted 
as a Hamannian language of God: 
1. Elements: extraordinary physical facts like turning water into wine. 
2. Institution: Jesus uses the extraordinary physical facts as a gesture to 
address creatures. 
3. Symbolization of the miraculous: the extraordinary facts and their 
use as a speech-act constitute a symbol of the miraculous spirit in 
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the communicative relationship between God, the phenomena and 
the onlookers who are addressed through it. 
Wittgenstein thus acquired a practical grasp of Hamann’s view of 
divine language during the spring of 1931. Accordingly, Wittgenstein 
had the option of interpreting the harmony of language and reality 
in Hamannian terms from the spring of 1931 onwards, because 
Hamann’s views of divine language and of the harmony of language 
and reality correspond to each other. Lecture notes made during the 
Lent Term of January–March 1931 point to the possibility that 
Wittgenstein indeed took the option: 
Instead, give a description of symbols, or rather of signs. What we 
describe is the signs. The sign plus the rules of grammar applying to it 
is all we need. We need nothing further to make the connection with 
reality. [...] The grammatical rules applying to it determine the meaning 
of the word. Its meaning is not something else, some object to which it 
corresponds or does not correspond. The word carries its meaning with 
it; it has a grammatical body behind it, so to speak. Its meaning cannot 
be something else which may not be known. It does not carry its 
grammatical rules with it. They describe its usage subsequently. (LWL: 
58–59) 
These notes from 9.3.1931 point to an understanding of rule-
following that resembles Hamann’s view of language. Language is 
composed of the elements of signs and the institutions of 
grammatical rules of language-use. Together they intertwine the 
word with its meaning to form a symbol, and thus connect the 
meaning with reality. We can then conclude that Wittgenstein 
developed his views on the harmony of language and reality in a 
dialogue with Hamannian themes after Sraffa had refuted the picture 
theory. Wittgenstein also proposed a Hamannian answer to the 
problem in the spring of 1931. 
3. Hamann and Wittgenstein: Overlapping Views 
Wittgenstein can then be interpreted in light of his reception of 
Hamann’s ideas in 1931, by using Hamann as a point of comparison. 
The significance of the comparisons depends on one’s paradigm for 
interpreting Wittgenstein’s late philosophy. The Baker & Hacker 
(1980, 1985; see also Appelqvist 2007) interpretation allows one to 
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read Wittgenstein in light of the comparison, as it interprets 
Wittgenstein’s later philosophy in terms of rule-following and dates 
Wittgenstein’s turn to his later philosophy to 1930–32. One can also 
account for the Hamannian themes in Wittgenstein’s late philosophy 
in dialectical and polyphonic accounts (Wallgren 2006; Baker 2004). 
A polyphonic interpretation of Wittgenstein can include the claim 
that Wittgenstein developed a Hamannian view of the harmony of 
language and reality in 1931 and an epistemology of faith in 1951, 
and offers them as a dialectical alternative to the Augustinian picture 
(PI: §2) and the rationalism of the philosophical tradition. 
One should also note that Wittgenstein’s views on rule-following 
developed over the years, as he moved from a view of language-
games as calculi with fixed rules to a view that interprets rules in 
terms of the harmony of language and reality in use (Baker & Hacker 
1980; Stern 1995). However, the parallelism between Hamann and 
Wittgenstein concerns the harmony of language and reality, while the 
relationships of rules and use in the institutions of language may be 
left fluid. Baker and Hacker (1985: 81–91) argue that Wittgenstein’s 
view on rule-following (PI: §197) is to be understood against the 
background of his discussions of the harmony of language and reality 
in 1930–32, and that PI §§431–432 originate from these discussions: 
“There is a gulf between an order and its execution. It has to be filled 
by the act of understanding.”  
“Only in the act of understanding is it meant that we are to do THIS. 
The order—why, that is nothing but sounds, ink-marks.—”  
Every sign by itself seems dead. What gives it life?—In use it is alive. Is 
life breathed into it there?—Or is the use its life? (PI: §§431–432) 
 
I straightforwardly use Hamann’s metaphor of language as a 
sacrament to interpret Wittgenstein’s view of the harmony of 
language and reality, as the lecture notes on 9.3.1931 and the 
interpretation of the Cana story resemble Hamann’s views. The 
elements of language are signs, like the words “Let’s play a game of 
chess!” The institutions of language are the practices of use like 
playing and teaching chess. The practices connect the sign “Let’s play 
a game of chess!” with its objects, like chess-pieces and the rules of 
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chess. They give the words “Let’s play a game of chess!” a use, 
thereby making them meaningful. The practices of playing chess thus 
connect the meaning with the words “Let’s play a game of chess!”, 
and the words with the game of chess, thereby connecting the 
meaning of the words “Let’s play a game of chess!” with games of 
chess, chess-pieces and the rules of chess. The connection of signs, 
meanings and objects take place against the background of 
communicative forms of life, which are more fundamental 
underlying practices (PI: §§23, 197, 431–432; see Baker & Hacker 
1980, 1985; cf. Bayer 2002.) To sum up, language consists of 
1. Elements: signs like “Let’s play a game of chess!” 
2. Institutions: rule-governed practices like playing and teaching chess. 
3. Symbols, which form the harmony of language and reality: Meanings 
form a unity with their signs in a symbol and are connected with 
their objects through the institutions of regular use in linguistic 
practices and forms of life. 
The sacramental metaphor can also illuminate commonalities in the 
grounds of Hamann’s and Wittgenstein’s philosophy of psychology 
and mathematics. According to the Lutheran tradition, a sacrament 
has its role and use in the exchange of words between God and man, 
so its normativity is communicative. Elements like bread and wine 
are constitutive of the sacrament, so they also help constitute to the 
spiritual relationship they mediate (cf. Kusch 2011). The metaphor 
of language as a sacrament has many important consequences in the 
philosophy of language. Language constitutes action in commu-
nicative relationships and conveys reality through linguistic 
communication, because the conveyed realities have a role in the 
activities of language-use. Concepts and expressions are united in 
language through regular language-use. The normativity of linguistic 
institutions and their rules is communicative. Therefore, there can 
be no private language-use outside linguistic relationships. Language 
has its worth and norms through language-use, which intertwines 
language and reality and makes reality, mental states and rational 
concepts a part of the language-games. There can, therefore, be no 
ideal concepts and norms of representation that are prior to 
language-use and no ideal languages expressing such ideal 
relationships. Language is used in activities and human life in the 
Lauri Snellman  CC-BY 
76 
 
world. Its institutions and actions are a free response based on a 
relationship of trust, which makes reality present in linguistic 
activities (LW: 37; Bayer 2002; cf. Hein 1983). 
Hamann and Wittgenstein both build their discussions of the 
philosophy of psychology and the philosophy of mathematics on 
these overlapping views on the harmony of language and reality. 
Hamann uses divine sacramental language as a model for the 
mind/body-relationship and the authority of mathematical axioms: 
The passage from the divine to the human seems to me to be exposed 
to similar abuses. Both extremes must absolutely be united, to explain 
the whole,   and   . Through 
this union a book becomes holy, like a man becomes a prince. A  
without transubstantiation––not a body, or a shadow, but Spirit. (ZH 4: 
254)
Hamann proposes the view that the soul is embodied, and 
mathematical axioms and results have their authority through forms 
and institutions in relationships of action and use (Bayer 2002: 32–
34). Mathematical certainty is constituted by mathematical language-
use: “Mathematical certainty rests entirely on the nature of its 
language, and its way of writing (Schreiberey)” (ZH 5: 359). Similarly, 
the body expresses the hidden human personality, as divine language 
reveals God (Dickson 1995: 144–145): 
The covering form of the body, the countenance of the head, and the 
extremities of the arms are the visible habit in which we walk but are 
actually nothing but an index of the secret self within us; Each is a miniature 
counterpart of GOD. (N II: 198, quoted in Dickson 1995: 144)  
Wittgenstein’s views on the foundations of mathematics and 
psychology are “two fruits on the same tree” (Baker & Hacker 1985: 
8–22). Both build on Wittgenstein’s views of rule-following and the 
harmony of language and reality, which make up the core of the 
Philosophical Investigations (Baker & Hacker 1985: x). Wittgenstein 
argues that the referentialist Augustinian picture of language (PI: §2) 
is a misleading model for mathematical and psychological language. 
The key insight is that mathematical and psychological language is 
fundamentally communicative and operates with the elements of 
public expressions and the institutions of public language-games, 
practices and their rules. They thereby disclose and constitute private 
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states and mathematical results by articulating private states and the 
rules of mathematics in public discussion (cf. Taylor 1985; Bayer 
2002: 296–306). Wittgenstein’s strategy is to expose various forms 
of conceptual confusion by emphasizing language-use. Concepts are 
changed by taking them out of their linguistic contexts, the 
boundaries of language-games are transgressed and pictures based 
on different language-games cross to produce metaphysical 
nonsense (cf. Gray 2012; Dickson 1995: 311–318). 
Hein (1983: 42–49; see also Labron 2009: 53–57) also notes that 
Hamann and Wittgenstein use an epistemology based on faith and 
trust to reject the Enlightenment’s attempt to find an Archimedean 
point outside the world. Hamann argues that the modern 
subject/object split leads to an irresolvable problem of skepticism. 
Reason does not give us an Archimedean point, because language 
constitutes reason and language is based on experience, tradition and 
use. Language is dependent on faith, which involves the recognition 
of present reality. Wittgenstein argues that social and physical 
language-games are the foundations for giving reasons, so Cartesian 
doubt is in the end nonsensical. Like Hamann, he argues that 
language-games are possible only if we trust the realities that are 
present through them. 
Hamann develops a view that knowledge is based on “faith 
alone” in Sokratische Denkwürdigkeiten (Betz 2009: 82–84):  
Our own existence and the existence of all things outside us must be 
believed and can be made out in no other way. (N II: 73, quoted in Betz 
2009: 82–83) 
Hamann argues that faith is the foundation for our knowledge and 
thus prior to reason. He goes on to discuss the story of Moses to 
show that reason is not even sufficient to produce belief: Moses had 
to trust God in order to believe that he would die, even though he 
had very strong empirical reasons to believe it (N II: 73). Dickson 
takes the importance of trust and personal relationships to mean that 
Hamann takes faith as a kind of “personal knowledge” (see Polanyi 
1958). Faith is a personal relationship to the truth and the object of 
faith, which involves epistemological trust in the object and 
recognition of its presence (Dickson 1995: 70–71; Hein 1983: 47–
49). Hamann links faith with the senses and uses the term 
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“Empfindung” (“experiential”, N II: 73) to refer to it. Dickson 
interprets the term “Empfindung” to refer to a perception that 
establishes a relationship with the object and forms a holistic picture 
of it (1995: 47–49). Faith then interprets our experience and renders 
it credible as if it were seeing-as or Gestalt-formation. Hamann holds 
faith to be sensual, because he takes sensuous reality to be divine 
language. The interpretation of the world through belief-systems is 
thus a recognition of the address that we encounter through the 
senses (N II: 198–199; Bayer 2002: 78–80). 
Wittgenstein argues for similar claims in On Certainty. One should 
keep in mind that Wittgenstein received the volume of Hamann’s 
works containing Sokratische Denkwürdigkeiten as a Christmas present 
in 1950. He wrote the latter part of On Certainty (OC: §§300–651) 
between February and April 1951 and mentioned that he was reading 
Hamann in a letter on 14.3.1951 (McGuinness 2008: 475; Monk 
1992: 576–579). Wittgenstein argues that language-games are based 
on faith: 
It is always by favour of Nature that one knows something. [...] I really 
want to say that a language-game is only possible if one trusts something 
(I did not say “can trust something”). (OC: §§505, 509) 
Hein (1983: 48–49) comments these sections by comparing Wittgen-
stein to Hamann. Wittgenstein replaces the search for absolute 
foundations with an examination of our linguistic forms of life. Like 
Hamann, he holds that language is possible only, if we take reality to 
be trustworthy in our language-games. In OC §505, Wittgenstein 
even states that knowledge is in the end by grace alone. Wittgenstein 
wrote OC §505 on 11.4.1951, and on the 14.3. he wrote to Rhees 
that he had been reading Hamann.  
Wittgenstein also takes up the belief-laden and relational nature 
of perception when discussing Gestalt-perception: 
It is almost as if ‘seeing the sign in this context’ were an echo of a 
thought.  
“The echo of a thought in sight”—one would like to say. (PI II: 213) 
Wittgenstein here discusses the intertwining of senses and reason in 
Gestalt-perception (see Hein 1983, 22; Glock 1996, 36–40). Seeing a 
picture from a different angle is not a new private mental object. We 
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form a different relationship with the object by reacting differently. 
A new way of seeing or a new thought flashes through the old 
picture, because we form a new practice of looking at it. Wittgenstein 
took different ways of seeing things as a response to reality. Human 
beings naturally respond to certain general states of affairs with 
certain kinds of communicative action, and then build world-views 
for interpreting experience on these responses (Moore 2007). 
Wittgenstein argues that our world-views and Gestalts are practical 
responses to the world: 
We form the picture of the earth as a ball floating free in space and not 
altering essentially in a hundred  years. I said “We form the picture etc.” 
and this picture now helps us in the judgment of various situations. [...] 
The picture of the earth as a ball is a good picture, it proves itself 
everywhere, it is also a simple picture—in short, we work with it without 
doubting it. (OC: §§146–147) 
I present the conclusion that interpreting Wittgenstein’s late 
philosophy by using Hamann as a point of comparison reveals an 
important overlap in their views. Both develop a view emphasizing 
language-use, which analyzes language-use into signs, their rule-
governed and practical use, and meanings that are made part of 
language and that are present in its symbols through use. The 
harmony of language and reality depends on the intertwining of 
words and concepts in use, which Hamann describes with the 
metaphor of sacramental divine language. Since meanings are 
constituted and intertwined with signs through use, there can be no 
private non-communicative languages or ideal languages that convey 
representative relationships that are conceptually prior to the use of 
signs. Language is a free and autonomous response to reality through 
interpretative practices, and it is based on trust and recognition of 
the objects that are its constitutive realities. 
4. Conclusion 
We have found out that Wittgenstein refers to Hamann’s authorship 
in his diary remarks and letters from 1930–31 and 1950–51. He also 
was acquainted with the style and key themes of Hamann’s work. 
The themes of divine language and knowledge through faith then 
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inspired Wittgenstein, when he was rethinking the harmony of 
language and reality in 1930–31, and the problem of knowledge in 
1950–51. The comparison of Hamann’s and Wittgenstein’s view also 
highlights an important overlap in their views, as both argue that 
meanings are connected with signs through use, so neither non-
communicative private languages nor ideal languages transporting 
prelinguistic concepts are possible.  
 
References 
Appelqvist, H., 2007. Wittgenstein and the Conditions of Musical Communication. 
Helsinki: Acta Philosophica Fennica. 
Baker, G. P., 2004. Wittgenstein’s Method. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Baker, G. P. and Hacker, P. M. S., 1980. An Analytical Commentary on 
Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Baker, G. P. and Hacker, P. M. S., 1985. Wittgenstein: Rules, Grammar and 
Necessity. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Bayer, O., 2012. A Contemporary in Dissent: Johann Georg Hamann as a Radical 
Enlightener. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans. 
Bayer, O., 1991. Schöpfung als Anrede. Tübingen: Mohr. 
Bayer, O., 2002. Vernunft ist Sprache: Hamanns Metakritik Kants. Stuttgart: 
Frommann-Holzboog. 
Betz, J., 2009. After Enlightenment. Oxford: Wiley. 
Betz, J., 2004. “Enlightenment revisited: Hamann as the First and Best Critic 
of Kant’s Philosophy”. Modern Theology, 20:2, pp. 291–301. 
Bhaskar, R., 2008. A Realist Theory of Science. London: Verso. 
Dickson, G. G., 1995. Johann Georg Hamann’s Relational Metacriticism. Berlin: 
De Gryuter. 
Drury, M. O’C., 1981. “Conversations with Wittgenstein”. In: R. Rhees, ed., 
Ludwig Wittgenstein: Personal Recollections. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 112–
189. 
Garver, N., 1994. This Complicated Form of Life. La Salle, IL: Open Court. 
Glock, H.-J., 1996. A Wittgenstein Dictionary. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Glock, H.-J., 2015. “Philosophy of Language”. In: M. N. Forster and K. 
Gjesdal, eds. The Oxford Handbook of German Philosophy in the Nineteenth 
Century. Oxford: OUP, pp. 371–397. 
Gray, J., 2012. “Hamann, Nietzsche and Wittgenstein on the Language of the 
Philosophers”. In: L. Anderson, ed., Hamann and the Tradition. 
Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, pp. 104–121. 
Nordic Wittgenstein Review 7 (1) 2018 | pp. 59-82 | DOI 10.15845/nwr.v7i1.3467 
81 
 
Green, M., 2014 “Speech-acts”. In: E. Zalta, ed., Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy. Available at: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/speech-acts/ (accessed 
23.11.2017). 
Hamann, J. G., 1947–1951. Sämtliche Werke 1–3. Ed. J. Nadler. Vienna: 
Verlag Herder. (N I–III) 
Hamann, J. G., 1955–1979. Briefwechsel 1–7. Eds. W. Ziesemer and A. Henkel.  
Frankfurt am Main: Insel Verlag. (ZH 1–7) 
Hamann, J. G., 2007. Writings on Philosophy and Language. Trans. and ed. K. 
Haynes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (H)  
Hein, H., 1983. ”Hamann und Wittgenstein: Aufklärungskritik als Reflexion 
über die Sprache”. In: B. Gajek, ed., Acta des zweiten internationalen 
Hamann-Colloquiums in Marburg/Lahn. Marburg: Elwert, pp. 21–57. 
Janik, A. and Toulmin, S., 1973. Wittgenstein’s Vienna. New York, NY: Simon 
& Schuster. 
Kusch, M., 2011. “Disagreements and Pictures in Wittgenstein’s ‘Lectures on 
Religious Beliefs’”. In: R.Heinrich, E. Nemeth, W. Pichler and D. 
Wagner, eds., Image and Imaging in Philosophy, Science and the Arts, Vol. 1. 
Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, pp. 35–58. Available at 
http://univie.academia.edu/MartinKusch (accessed 10.5.2017). 
Labron, T., 2009. Wittgenstein and Theology. London: Bloomsbury. 
Luther, M., 1958–1986. Luther’s Works. Ed. J. Pelikan and H. T. Lehmann. 
Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press. (LW) 
McGuinness, B., ed., 2008. Wittgenstein in Cambridge. Malden, MA: Blackwell. 
Monk, R., 1990. Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius. London: Cape. 
Moore, A. W., 2007. “Wittgenstein and Transcendental Idealism”. In: G. 
Kahane, E. Kanterian and O. Kuusela, eds.,Wittgenstein and his 
Interpreters. Malden, MA: Blackwell, pp. 174–199. 
Munz, R., 2009. “Ludwig Wittgenstein: Vom Vortrag über Ethik zu 
Vorlesungen über religiösen Glauben”. In: W. Lütterfelds and T. 
Mohrs, eds., Globales Ethos. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, pp. 
125–145. 
Polanyi, M., 1958. Personal Knowledge. Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press. 
Stern, D. G., 1995. Wittgenstein on Mind and Language. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. [Accessed online.] 
Taylor, C., 1985. Philosophical Papers, Vol. 1. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Vygotsky, L., 1962. Thought and Language. Eds. and trans. E. Hanfmann and 
G. Vakar. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Wallgren, T., 2006. Transformative Philosophy. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. 
Wittgenstein, L., 1922. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Trans. C. K. Ogden. 
London: Kegan Paul.  (TLP) 
Lauri Snellman  CC-BY 
82 
 
Wittgenstein, L., 1953. Philosophical Investigations. Trans. G. E. M. Anscombe. 
Oxford: Blackwell. [Accessed through the Past Masters online series.] 
(PI) 
Wittgenstein, L., 1969. On Certainty. Oxford: Blackwell. [Accessed through 
the Past Masters online series.] (OC) 
Wittgenstein, L, 1980: Wittgenstein’s Lectures, Cambridge 1930–32, From the Notes 
of John King and Desmond Lee. Ed. D. Lee. Totowa, NJ: Rowman and 
Littlefield. (LWL) 
Wittgenstein, L., 1993. Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough. In: Wittgenstein, L., 
Philosophical Occasions 1912–1951.  Eds.  J. C. Klagge and A. 
Nordmann. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, pp. 115–
155. (RF) 
Wittgenstein, L., 1998. Culture and Value. London: Blackwell. [Accessed 
through the Past Masters online series.] (CV) 
Wittgenstein, L., 1997. Denkbewegungen: Tagebücher 1930–32, 1936–1937. Ed. I. 
Somavilla. Innsbruck: Haymon. (DB) 
Biographical Note 
Lauri Snellman is a doctoral student at the University of Helsinki. He is 
writing a dissertation on the problem of evil. His work builds on 
Hamannian metacritical philosophy, Wittgensteinian philosophy of 
language and grammatical philosophical methods. 
